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ABSTRACT 
A notion of nondeterministic inference on inexact information is introduced. The 
model is characterized by a second order probability distribution on beliefs together with 
an updating procedure. Such nondeterministic inference processes naturally generate a
corresponding deterministic process which essentially involves calculating the expected 
response of the nondeterministic process. Given that the number of propositional 
variables in the relevant language may vary, it is natural to consider hierarchies of 
inference processes, these being characterized by hierarchies of prior distributions. A
number of logical principles are considered which in the presence of certain smoothness 
assumptions restrict the choice of hierarchies to hierarchies of symmetric Dirichlet 
priors where each prior is defined up to a parameter A which is constant over the whole 
hierarchy. A principle of maximal expected ependency between propositional variables 
is then introduced which restricts h to a particular value. © 1997 Elsevier Science Inc. 
KEYWORDS: nondeterministic inference process, second order probability 
distribution, hierarchy, axiomatic 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent research into artificial intelligence and in particular the con- 
struction of expert systems has brought about a resurgence of interest into 
inductive methods. Historically, the development of inductive logic has 
centered around the problem of quantifying the likelihood or credibility of 
a hypothesis given a certain body of evidence. In particular, this has often 
been restricted (see de Finetti [5], Johnson [8], Carnap [1]) to finding the 
probability of the occurrence of some event at the nth trial in a sequence 
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of trials given the outcomes of the previous trials. In the sequel we shall 
refer to this restricted notion of induction as classical induction. The 
problem of managing uncertainty in expert systems, however, necessitates 
a different formulation of the notion of inductive inference. 
1.1. Inductive Inference in Inexact Reasoning 
Consider the following situation where a doctor with strong expertise in 
the diagnosis of a certain disease D is asked to provide a sequence of 
statements expressing his general knowledge in this area, or at least a 
fragment of it. Then he might well give the following replies: 
Symptom S strongly suggests D. 
Patients of blood group B rarely develop D. 
Patients of blood group B with symptom S are much more likely than 
not to have disease D. 
A small proportion of patients are of blood group B. 
It seems apparent hen that the doctor is revealing a set of rules and 
background information which he considers fundamental to his reasoning 
process. By the latter we mean the process by which he is able to make 
judgments about his belief in statements concerning S, B, and D which do 
not appear above. However, before we discuss notions of inductive infer- 
ence that might be taking place here, let us initially consider how to 
formalize the above statements. 
Now although the meanings of the natural language terms such as 
"strongly suggests" and "rarely develop" are ambiguous, they do seem to 
refer to degrees of belief or conditional belief, where it is assumed that the 
degree of belief of an agent in a statement quantifies his or her uncertainty 
regarding the truth of that statement. It is, of course, highly debatable 
whether or not the concept of belief as it occurs in human discourse can 
be modeled in a quantitative way. The objection is often put forward that 
generally human beings are not able to make such numerical allocations in 
a meaningful or even consistent way. The claim has even been made that 
beliefs in statements from any reasonably expressive language can at best 
be partially ordered. However, although we concede that it is often 
difficult for people to give precise values to their beliefs, we feel that this is 
due more to ignorance regarding the meaning of the statements hey are 
asked to consider and the relationships between them than the nature of 
human reasoning itself. Certainly, if individuals are questioned on a topic 
in which they have strong expertise, it seems to be possible for them to 
convert linguistic statements into ones concerning belief values. Further- 
more, if the aim is to develop a theory of uncertainty to be used in the 
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construction of expert systems, then it will not necessarily be the replica- 
tion of human reasoning that is required. Rather, leaving aside questions 
of computational complexity, we should be interested in the behavior of 
some ideally rational intelligent agent. 
In fact, we now make the assumption that belief is modeled not only in a 
quantitative manner but in terms of a probabilistic belief function. The 
choice of belief as probability can also be justified in terms of the 
reasoning of a rational agent regarding certain bets, although the details 
are beyond the scope of this paper (see Paris [11] for an exposition). 
To formalize this notion of belief, we restrict ourselves to the proposi- 
tional calculus with connectives A, v ,  -1. Let L be a countably infinite 
language of the propositional calculus with the above connectives and 
some enumeration of the propositional variables. Then let L (n) = 
{p~ . . . . .  pn}, these being the first n propositional variables in the enumera- 
tion of L. The sentences of L (") are denoted by SL ~.  We define a belief 
function and conditional belief function on St  (n) as follows. For 0, 
4) ~ SL (~) let E(O) be the belief value in 0 and E(Ol~b) the conditional 
belief value in 0 given ~b, so that 
E(  ) : SL C') ~ [0, 1] 
is a function satisfying: 
1. If ~ 0 then E(O)= 1. 
2. If ~ -1(0/x ~b) then E(O v 4)) = E(O) + E(qb), 
and 
E(-[-) : SL (") X SL (") ~ [0, 1] 
is a partial function such that 
E( O /x 4,) 
E(OJ~b) - 
E(~b) 
if E(~b) > 0 and is undefined otherwise. 
The above notation is motivated by the fact that if we consider 0 ~ SL (') 
as a random variable with possible outcomes 0 and 1, then the expected 
value of 0, E(0), is equal to the probability of the outcome 1. 
1.2. Knowledge Bases 
Returning now to our example, it seems natural to attempt o encode 
these statements as constraints on some probability function E. For 
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example, one possibility is 
0.02 <E(B)  
E(DIS)  > 0.75, 
E(D I B) < 0.25, 
E(D I B A S) > 0.7, 
< 0.05. 
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There are, of course, innumerable representations of the statements given 
in our example; we shall however assume that an agent's knowledge 
regarding the sentences of a given language is expressible in terms of sets 
of linear interval constraints on their probabilistic belief function and of 
interval constraints on their conditional belief function. That is, 
DEFINITION 1 A knowledge base of L (n) is a set of contraints of the 
following form: 
m i 
c i < ~ ai.jE(O j) < d i for 
j=l 
i=  1 , . . . , k ,  
ci<E(Oi l~bi)<d i andE(qb i )>O for i=k+l  . . . . .  l, 
where k , l~ ,  k <l,  ci, di, a i jE~,  c i<d i for j= l , . . . ,m i ,  i=  
1 . . . . .  k, and 0 < c i < d i < 1 for i = k + 1 . . . . .  l, and E is a probabilistic 
belief unction on SL (n). 
A possible justification for this definition of knowledge base is as 
follows. If it is supposed that an agent obtains his general knowledge from 
experience, then it is more natural to interpret his knowledge in terms of 
strict inequality constraints than, say, equality constraints, since most 
experience is only likely to enable the agent to put some bounds on his 
beliefs. In addition, if an agent's knowledge contains a constraint on 
conditional belief of the form 
E(Ol~b) ~(c ,d ) ,  O<c <d< 1, O,¢k ~s  L('). 
then it seems natural to assume, in this context, that he must also know 
that E(~b) > O. This is because if the agent's information comes from 
experience rather than being theoretical, then to know anything regarding 
0 in situations when ~b holds, he must have experienced such situations. 
Clearly, however, this argument is not applicable in the case where ~b is a 
tautology, since for any 0 ~ SL (n) where it is known that E(O) ~ (c, d), it 
can be deduced that E(O[4,) ~ (c, d) without having any empirical knowl- 
edge relating specifically to ~b. However, it would seem somewhat unnatu- 
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ral to explicitly state the latter conditional probability in the knowledge 
base. Hence, in this model of knowledge bases it is assumed that all 
constraints result from empirical evidence only, rather than being deduced 
from other constraints and a priori knowledge relating to logical structure. 
Notice that the above definition of knowledge base does not allow for 
the representation of independence constraints. This might be viewed as a 
defect, but the issue of independence constraints in expert systems is far 
from straightforward. For example, according to Courtney [2], allowing 
such constraints means that inference processes with even the bare mini- 
mum of what one might think of as desirable properties no longer exist. 
1.3. A Geometric Representation of Probabilistic Belief Functions and 
Knowledge Bases 
By the disjunctive normal form theorem of propositional ogic (see 
Enderton [3]) we have that every sentence of L (") is logically equivalent to 
a disjunction of sentences of the form A 7 Pf' where ei ~ {0, 1} and where 
pl represents p and p0 represents -~ p. The equivalence classes, under 
logical equivalence, containing these sentences form the atoms of the 
Lindenbaum algebra generated by L (n) relative to the natural ordering on 
Boolean algebras, and hence we refer to them as atoms. For a language of 
size n there are 2" atoms, which we enumerate by 




j=2  " -  Ee /2  "-i 
i=1 
Clearly the atoms of L ~n) satisfy ~ ~(a~ n) A a~ ~)) for i 4 : j  and 
V ~'= 1a~ ")- Further, as mentioned above, V0 e SL (n) ~ 0 ~ V i ~ so a~ ~), 
where S o = {i ~ {1 . . . . .  2"} [ a~ ") ~ 0}. This means that every belief func- 
tion E on L (") is uniquely determined by its values on the atoms, since 
VO ~ SL  (') E (O)  = Ei ~ so E(a!n) ) .  Now consider the following 2" - 1 di- 
mensional simplex. 
DEFINITION 2 
{ 2n } 
V (n) = ~ [0,1]  2" ~x  i = 1 C [0,1] 2n. 
i=1 
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It can easily be seen that every £ ~ V (n) naturally corresponds to a 
probabilistic belief function E on L (n) where we take E(o~ n)) = x i for 
i = 1 . . . . .  2 ". In this sense, then, there is a natural correspondence b - 
tween V (") and the set of all probabilistic belief functions on L ("). 
Furthermore, for any knowledge base K of L (") there is a corresponding 
subset V(n)(K) of V (") consisting of those points satisfying the set of 
constraints formed by substituting Ei ~ so xi for every occurrence of E(0), 
for all 0 in SL (~), in the constraints of K. It can be shown that for any 
knowledge base K of L ~"), V(")(K) is convex and, provided K is consis- 
tent, that the dimension of V(n)(K) is 2" - 1 (see [9] for details). 
1.4. An Inference Process Based on Second Order Probability 
In the light of the above formalization of the notion of knowledge base, 
we are now able to give a clearer exposition of what might be meant by 
inductive inference in inexact reasoning. An inference process is taken to 
be a mechanism by which, when given a knowledge base K on L (n), an 
agent is able to select a probabilistic belief function on SL (n~ consistent 
with K. Now let us for the moment consider what properties uch a 
mechanism ight exhibit. 
If a human expert is asked to give his or her belief in some statement 
relative to a fixed knowledge base on different occasions, he or she is 
unlikely to give exactly the same responses. This might be interpreted as 
being the result of some error arising in the inference procedure, but we 
feel that it is more likely to be a manifestation of uncertainties inherent in 
the reasoning process itself. In other words, we claim that human reason- 
ing from uncertain information is inherently nondeterministic. However, 
we would argue that the probabilities underlying the nondeterministic 
responses of the agent should be taken to be subject to objective natural 
criteria. Although what constitutes "natural criteria" in this context is 
open to interpretation, in keeping with earlier comments, we assume these 
criteria to be those which characterize an ideally rational nondeterministic 
reasoning mechanism. In other words, when asked to give a precise value 
to his or her beliefs in a number of given statements then, up to consis- 
tency, the agent makes a guess, but it is an educated guess based on a 
priori and background knowledge. 
It is proposed then that the answers given by the expert were generated 
according to some underlying second order distribution on beliefs consis- 
tent with the knowledge base. That is to say, they are generated according 
to a distribution conditional on the knowledge base, which is determined 
by some updating procedure from an initial prior. In this model, then, you 
could consider the reasoning process to be essentially a prior and an 
updating procedure. 
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The idea of second order distributions in Bayesian inference has been 
widely discussed by, among others, de Finetti (see [5]) and Good (see [6] 
and [7]), who comments: 
Most of the justifications of the axioms of subjective probability assume sharp 
probabilities or clear-cut decisions, but there is always some vagueness and one 
way of trying to cope with it is to allow for the confidence that you feel in your 
judgements and to represent this confidence by probabilities of a higher type. 
Good goes on to suggest hird and higher order probabilities are defined 
until 
the guessed expected utility of going further becomes negative if the cost is taken 
into account. 
We would claim, however, that the above comments express a com- 
pletely different interpretation of the notion of second order probability 
than is put forward here. It would appear that Good is proposing higher 
order probabilities as a formalization of some notion of higher order belief 
where an agent holds beliefs, beliefs in beliefs, and so on. In contrast, 
however, we view second order probabilities as characterizing a nondeter- 
ministic inference process on beliefs. From this perspective, then, the 
agent is viewed as holding beliefs and being able to make inferences on 
these beliefs to form new beliefs, but in no sense able to make judgments 
concerning higher order beliefs. To put it another way, the agent has no 
explicit representation of the second order distribution as he does of first 
order distributions, but rather the higher order uncertainty is implicit in 
his reasoning process. A consequence of this different viewpoint is that the 
notion of higher order probability with order greater than two is irrelevant 
to our model. Furthermore, various philosophical problems relating to the 
meaning of higher order beliefs are avoided, since in this context the 
second order distributions do not represent beliefs. 
An important assumption implicit in our model of inference is that of 
the existence of objective prior probabilities. This notion has been strongly 
criticized, and many have even argued that the concept is meaningless. 
Fine, for example, claims in [4] that 
The interpretation of a classical prior distribution is particularly problematic: it 
seems to be an objectification of subjective prior knowledge. Extracting unique 
quantitative probabilities from ignorance or very little prior knowledge can only 
harmfully obscure our ignorance. 
It seems, though, that this view ignores the necessity for human beings to 
make objective judgements based on inadequate information by suggesting 
that human ignorance has no objective structure. Furthermore, for obvious 
practical reasons, the capability of expert systems to make inferences 
based on small amounts of data is of paramount importance for many real 
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world applications. Hence, the assumption of an objective structure to an 
agent's ignorance, in our case embodied by a second order prior distribu- 
tion, would appear to be a necessary part of any model of induction for 
inexact reasoning. 
We now proceed to consider a possible formalization of the above 
inference process. Let ~v-(n) be the algebra of Borel subsets of V (n), and 
let Prob (n) be a probability measure on ~-(n). At this point we make a 
smoothness assumption and consider only those measures Prob (n) with a 
density function, denoted f(n), where f(~) is continuous on Int(V(n)), the 
set of interior points of V (n). The class of all such densities for n ~1/'> 0 is 
denoted by ~'. A conditional density function relative to the prior f(~) and 
a knowledge base K of L (~) is now defined in the standard way. 
DEFINITION 3 I f  f (n) is a prior density in ~ and K is a knowledge base of 
L (~) such that Prob(")(K) > 0, then 
( 
f (n)(k ' lK)  = ~ fr~,,(K) f (n ) (~)dV (~) V~ V(~' (K)n  Int(V(n)), 
otherwise. 
Thus, our inference process for L (n) consists of the prior f(~) together 
with the updating procedure involving the formation of the above condi- 
tional density. 
Up to now we have considered the language L (n) as fixed. However, if we 
allow n to vary and then for each value of n >_ 1 define a probability 
measure Prob (~) with density f(n), we naturally obtain a hierarchy of prior 
densities, denoted {f(~)}. More formally, 
DEFINITION 4 A hierarchy of prior densities is a sequence {f(n)} for 
n~,n>O.  
We conclude this section with a brief note on an alternative determinis- 
tic notion of inference process proposed by Paris (see [11]) and describe 
how it is related to the above nondeterministic notion. 
DEFINITION 5 Let CKB(L (n)) be the set of consistent knowledge bases of 
D n), and let PF(L (n)) be the set ofprobabilistic belief functions on L (~). 
Then a deterministic inference process relative to a language L (n) is a 
function 
N(L  (n)) : CKB(L (n)) ~ PF(L (n)) 
such that N(L("))(K) is consistent with K. 
Now if we consider the expected responses of an agent reasoning 
according to the nondeterministic model relative to a particular knowledge 
base, then it can easily be seen that this forms a deterministic nference 
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process as defined above. We shall refer to this deterministic inference 
process as the center of mass inference process relative to a prior f(n). 
More formally, 
DEFINITION 6 For K ~ CKB(L (")) such that Prob(")(K) > 0 the center 
of mass inference process relative to f(m is given by 
VO ~ SL (") CMf'"'(0) = f ° E xif(")(x~ K) dV(") 
V ( )(K)i~So 
fV("'(K) Ei ~ S o xi f(n)(~) dV (n) 
fv("'(K) f(n)( ~) dr(,,) 
The name of this inference process is motivated by the fact that if 
CM~">(a~ )) =Yi, then y is the center of mass of the region V(")(K) 
calculated according to f(~). Also, note that the conditions of the above 
definition are satisfied, since v(n)(K) is convex, which implies that ~" 
V('°(K), and this in turn implies that CM~ '") is a probability function on 
SL ('° consistent with K. 
2. A CHARACTERIZATION OF NATURAL DISTRIBUTIONS IN 
INEXACT REASONING 
Having proposed a framework for an inference process, we still have to 
face the formidable problem of selecting natural prior distributions or, 
more precisely, hierarchies of distributions. This problem has parallels 
with the old statistical problem of defining priors for use in Bayesian 
inference. It has often been pointed out that for some types of Bayesian 
reasoning the choice of prior is relatively unimportant assuming large 
sample sizes. Furthermore, Bayesian statisticians have, in spite of the 
arguments put forward by Johnson [8] and Carnap [1], tended to adopt a 
rather ad hoc approach to selecting priors. In the present context of 
inexact reasoning, however, the choice of prior is of fundamental impor- 
tance, and hence we feel it is necessary to develop an approach based on 
epistemological considerations. 
2.1. Principles on Prior Distributions 
The traditional response to the problem, attributed to Laplace in the 
case n = 1 (see Zabell [15] for a discussion), is that in the absence of any 
other information the principle of insufficient reason forces us to choose 
f(n) to be the uniform distribution [i.e., Prob(n)(R) proportional to the 
volume of R for R ~ ~v-(,)]. However, we shall demonstrate, at least for 
the more general n dimensional problem, that this is unsatisfactory. 
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Given the necessity for any intelligent agent to be able to reason using 
the sentences of D n) for any n, it is clear that we must consider hierar- 
chies of inference processes, in this case characterized by hierarchies of 
prior densities. For this reason a number of the principles we shall propose 
will be related to such hierarchies. Initially, however, we explicitly state a 
fundamental renaming principle. 
PI: WEAK RENAMING Let tr be a permutation of the atoms of D ") 
resulting from transposing Pk and Pt or from transposing -7 Pk and Pt for 
some k, l ~ {1 . . . . .  n}. For each such o- there is a corresponding permuta- 
tion of each Y' ~ V ~n) such that 
O'(X i) =X j  iff or(ol (n)) = Ol (n) 
Then f~") satisfies weak renaming iff 
'¢Y'~ Int(V ~")) f~")(tr(ff')) = fCn)(k'), 
where for all tr 
= < o ' (x l )  . . . .  , o ' (x2 . )>.  
This simply amounts to saying that it is irrelevant which propositional 
variable we use to denote a particular proposition, and whether or not it is 
used to denote the proposition or its negation. 
P2: MARGINALITY Let {f(n)} be a hierarchy of prior densities, and let 
Y i=X2 i - l+X2 i  for i=  1 . . . .  ,2 "-1 
Let h(n)(y) be the marginal density function of I7 induced by f~n), so that 
tVJo 1 "'" fYJo Z"-'f(")(Xl, y - xl . . . . .  x2n-1, y2 .1 -  h~n)( x2n_  1 ) dK 
Then {f~n)} is said to satisfy marginality iff 
Vn > 1 ,qy~ Int(V~.-1)) f~. -1) (y )  = h~n)(y'). 
Note that in our enumeration the atoms of D "-  1) are related to those of 
a ~") --- a)" where Od (n) ~ O~ (n -  1) A p. and a2~ ) -  L t") by a2~ 7) A 2 j -  1 - 1), 2 j -  1 
O~ n- l )  A -~Pn" 
This axiom is motivated by the feeling that adding another propositional 
variable p.  to the language L ~n-l) should not affect our knowledge of 
sentences that do not contain p.. The axiom of marginality is sufficient o 
guarantee this in the presence of weak renaming. 
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We can now see that the assumption of the uniform measure is unsatis- 
factory in that it is inconsistent with marginality. In other words, if Prob ~") 
is defined to be the uniform measure at each level n, then the hierarchy of 
priors does not satisfy marginality. In addition, we observe that the 
uniform density is a special case of the symmetric Dirichlet system of 
densities given by 
V~ ~ Int(V (n)) d(h,n)(X') = F(A) F Hx/~/2"-1, 
i=1 
where A is a parameter on ~' > 0 corresponding to the uniform distribution 
when )t = 2". Dirichlet distributions are widely used in Bayesian statistics, 
at least in part because of their desirable mathematical properties. See 
Good [6] or Walley [13] for a recent example of their use. 
Now it can easily be seen that if f(") is a hierarchy of symmetric 
Dirichlet priors, then marginality is satisfied if and only if f(") = d(A, n) 
for all n > 0, where A is independent of n. 
The choice of {f(")} as a hierarchy of symmetric Dirichlet priors can, 
to a degree, be justified on epistemological grounds. Specifically, in addi- 
tion to marginality and weak renaming, consider the followings pleasant 
principles: 
P3: SMOOTH MULTIPLICATIVITY 
2 n 
Vx'~ Int(V (")) f(")(Y') = Hg}")(xi) ,  
i=1 
where Vi ~ {1 . . . . .  2"} g}'):[0, 1] ~ >- 0 such that g}n) is twice differen- 
tiable on (0, 1). 
This is essentially a smoothness condition, although it can be justified by 
an independence principle for atoms (see [9] and [10]). 
P4: NONNULLITY For all nonempty open subsets R of V (") there exists 
x* ~ R where f(n)(Z) > 0. Note that R is an open subset of V (") if and 
only if Rc_V  (m and VZ~R 3e>0 such that N(X':E) c_R, where 
N(k*: e) = {f ~ V( ' ) I L~-y l  < e}. 
The justification for this principle is that any consistent knowledge base 
should a priori have nonzero probability. 
P5: RELATIVE IGNORANCE This principle can be roughly stated as fol- 
lows: for any i ~ {1 . . . . .  n} the probability that Pi holds given that A j . /p j  
holds is independent of E(A j .  i Pj), the probability of A j .  i Pj" 
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The idea here is that since the constraint E(A j~i P )  ~ I provides no 
information about Pi, the relative distribution of probabilistic weight 
between the atoms Pi A A j . i Pj and -7 Pi A A j . i Pj should be indepen- 
dent of I. 
Now it can be shown that P1 to P5 form an epistemological characteriza- 
tion of hierarchies of symmetric Dirichlet priors {d(A, n)} where A is 
independent of n. The details of this result are beyond the scope of this 
paper but are well documented in [9] and [10]. 
2.2. Relationships with Classical Induction 
At this juncture we digress slightly and consider how the above method 
of inference is related to classical induction and in particular to Carnap's 
continuum of inductive methods. 
Suppose that, instead of knowledge bases of the form proposed above, 
our knowledge K consists of the outcomes of a sequence of N exchange- 
able trials (see [5]) where at each trial exactly one of the atoms of L (") 
occurs. Now if K contains the knowledge that the frequency of occurrence 
of each atom a(i ~) is t i for i = 1, . . . ,  n, then according to Bayes's theorem 
the conditional density f(n)(.[K) formed from f(n) is as follows: 
2 n 
Hi= 1 xf"f(n~(~) 
V2"~ Int(V (~)) f(n)(£1 K) = 
fv'"' I-I2~1 xNt' f  (n)(~) dV(n) " 
The expected value of xj conditional on K and relative to f(n) is then 
given by 
fv(n) XjI-I2nl xNti f(n)(~) dW (n) 
~ftn)(xj]K) = fv (n) l_i2i~ 1 xiUt,f( .)(e) aV( .  ) , 
so that for f(") = d(A, n) we have 
~d(a,n)(xj lg) = 
gt j  + A /2  n 
N+A 
In fact, rather more is true, and 
g"f(.~(xj[K) Ntj + Z/2n i f andon ly i f  f (n )=d(h ,n )  
N+A 
(see [15] for details). 
Clearly this can be viewed as a confirmation function quantifying 
the degree to which a hypothesis 0 is confirmed by a body of evidence K. 
That is, 
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for j ~ {1 .. . .  ,2n}, and 
VO ~ SL ~) c(An)(o, K) = ~_, C~")(a.(, ~, K). 
iES o 
Of course, as with density functions, it is often more natural to consider 
hierarchies of confirmation functions {C~)}. 
The above corresponds to Carnap's continuum of inductive methods, 
first proposed by Johnson [8] and later independently by Carnap [1] as 
being that which was characterized by a number of seemingly intuitive 
axioms. 
It is interesting to note that an original aim of Carnap's program was to 
justify the choice of a unique confirmation function for a given language in 
terms of logical axioms. In the context of Carnap's continuum this is 
equivalent to the problem of justifying the choice of a particular value of 
A. In the light of Carnap's failure to suggest such axioms, a pertinent 
question is whether, in the context of inexact reasoning, there are princi- 
ples characterizing a unique hierarchy of Dirichlet priors. In the next 
section we consider a possible criterion for selecting a particular value of A 
for the hierarchies of Dirichlet priors characterized by principles P1 to P5. 
23. The Expected Level of Dependence between Propositional Variables 
A rather natural question is what is the average level of dependence 
between propositional variables Pi and p/ with distributions generated 
according to some Dirichlet prior d(A, n)--in other words, what is the 
value of the following expression: 
O( pi, Pj) = ~d(A,n)([ E( pi A pj) -- E( pi)E( pj)] 2). 
Now it is a common assumption in statistics to a priori consider proposi- 
tional variables as being independent. In other words, priors that give high 
probability to distributions E where E(pi A p/) = E(pi)E(p/) tend to be 
favored. We would argue, however, that this is not representative of the 
sort of distributions for which, in practice, we would wish to make 
inductive inferences and construct expert systems. In practical situations 
the propositional variables tend to be highly correlated. Hence, in view of 
this claim, it might be justifiable to choose, as a "natural" hierarchy of 
Dirichlet priors, that which satisfies marginality and for which the value of 
D(pi, pj) is maximal. Now it can be shown that (see appendix) for symmet- 
ric Dirichlet priors 
A 
D(pi'PJ) = 16(A + 1)(A + 3) '  
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and it is easily seen that in this case D(pi,  pi) has a unique maximum 
value at A = x/3-. To summarize, then, principles P1 to P5 together with 
the condition of maximal expected dependency between propositional 
variables force us to select the hierarchy of priors {d(v~-, n)}. 
It is interesting to note that this requirement of a priori high correlation 
between propositional variables provides an additional argument against 
the selection of the uniform prior at all levels of the hierarchy. In fact, for 
any hierarchy of priors {d(K2",n)} with u independent of n so that 
f<n)(~) CX l--IZi"=l x~ for all n, we have that lira n_~ D(pi,  p )  = O. This is 
particularly worrying in that for most real world problems the number of 
propositional variables is likely to be large. 
Although conceived in the context of inexact reasoning, the notion of 
maximizing the expected dependency between propositional variables 
would seem equally applicable to Carnap's model of inductive inference, 
since, as described in the previous ection, this too can be characterized in
terms of Dirichlet priors and an updating procedure. Now a principle of 
language invariance quivalent to marginality for Carnap's continuum can 
be stated as follows: If 0 ~ SL ~-  1) and K is the relative frequency of a/~) 
for i = 1 . . . . .  2" in N exchangeable trials, then C~)(O, K) = c~n-1)(0, K). 
This principle restricts A to a constant independent of the number of 
propositional variables n, and hence, if we accept the above dependency 
condition, we are restricted to the hierarchy of confirmation functions 
{¢-, (n) 
3. CRITICISMS AND CONCLUSIONS 
It is important to note that we are not claiming that principles P1 to P5 
completely justify {d(A, n)} as "natural" hierarchies of priors for inexact 
reasoning. Indeed, there are a number of equally intuitive principles that 
these hierarchies do not satisfy. Paramount amongst hese is inferential 
monotonicity, proposed in Wilmers et al. [14], which requires that, for all E 
in (0, 1) the probability of E(pa A ... A Pn) ~ [E, 1] given E(p l )  = Yl . . . .  , 
E(pn)  = y, is a monotonic increasing function of Yl . . . . .  Yn" NOW for any 
hierarchy of symmetric Dirichlet priors {d(A,n)} satisfying marginality 
there is some n such that A/2 n < 1; and in this case the probability of 
E(p l  A "" A Pn) ~ [6, 1] given E(p l )  = Yl . . . . .  E(pn)  = Yn is strictly de- 
creasing in Yl at a certain yalue of Y2 . . . . .  yn and 6. Given that inferential 
monotonicity appears to be a particularly natural epistemological principle, 
its violation would seem to cast serious doubt on the naturalness of any 
hierarchy of Dirichlet priors. Furthermore, Paris et al. [12] argue that any 
natural prior for the n = 1 case should have peaks at 0, 1, 3,1 and in fact at 
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any point of the form i /2 k for i, k +~,  i < 2 k. Clearly, any symmetric 
Dirichlet prior d(A, 1) has its only peaks either at 0 and 1 or at 1, although 
the question of whether linear combinations of Dirichlet priors would 
better satisfy this requirement is perhaps worth future consideration. It is, 
however, by no means clear which epistemological principles such linear 
combinations might satisfy. Paris et al. [12] propose an alternative prior 
generated in a rather natural way from the propositional calculus and 
satisfying this requirement, but it appears problematic to extend their 
approach to higher dimensions. In addition, the pathological nature of this 
prior would probably lead to computational difficulties in practice. 
Althgough we have shown that d(v~-, n) maximizes D(pi, pj) for sym- 
metric Dirichlet priors, we have as yet not considered the absolute value of 
D(pi , pj) for this prior. In fact, for d(v~-, n) we have D(Pi, pj) -~ 8.3734 × 
10 -3, SO that ~/D(pi,pj) = 0.0915. In other words, probabilistic belief 
functions generated according to d(v~-, n) will on average have values of 
E(pi A pj) within about 0.09 of E(pi)E(pj). Now despite the fact that it is 
difficult to say what value of D(pi, pj) we would require for a "natural" 
prior, 0.09 does seem disturbingly small. Having said this, however, it may 
be the case that the epistemological principles we would require any 
"natural" hierarchy of priors to satisfy would in any case seriously restrict 
the possible values of D(pi, p j). 
In spite of the above comments, we do feel that it is interesting that the 
choice of hierarchies of Dirichlet priors {d(A, n)} can at least partially be 
justified by intuitive epistemological xioms. In addition, it is surprising 
that the condition of maximal expected ependency between propositional 
variables restricts A to a unique value. More generally, we would claim 
that the use of second order distributions in the nondeterministic model of 
inductive inference proposed above provides awhole new perspective from 
which to judge the suitability or naturalness of second order priors. 
Furthermore, it is this perspective that we should adopt even if we intend 
for practical purposes to construct expert systems based on the corre- 
sponding deterministic center of mass inference processes. 
APPENDIX 
We have 
D( pi, Py) = ~d(A, n)([ E( Pi A pj) -- E( pi)E( py)]2). 
Then w.l.o.g, consider 
g~d(a,,,)([E(pn A p._,) -- e(p . )E(p ._ l ) l  2) 
= g~d<x,,)([X -- (X  + Y ) (X  + W)]2), 
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where X = E J/4 ~- E(p.  A 1), Y = E J/4 = E(p .  A i=1 X4i-3 Pn- i=1 X4i-2 
-~Pn-1), and W= E+/4i=l Xni-i =E(~p n Apn_ 1) for J=  2 n. The above 
expression is equal to 
~d(A,n)((X- X 2 -- YX-  WX-  WY) 2) 
= ~a(A,n)((X(1 -- X - Y - W) - WY) 2) 
= ~'d(A,n)((XZ -- Wy)2), 
where Z= 1-X-Y -W=E(~p.A  ~pn_ l )=E J/4 and hence i=1 X4D 
is equal to ~d(~,.)(xZz 2 -- 2XZWY + W2y 2) = 2~d(X.n)(X2Z 2) -- 
2g~d(x,.)(XZWY) by the symmetry of d(h, n). 
Now, again by the symmetry of d(h, n), 
~d(A,n)(X2Z2)= (-'4 ~d(A,n,(XiXj ) + (-~ ] ,-~ -- l)2Fa(a,.)(XiXjXkXl) 
+2( J12 / J  - -~ ,  -4 1)~d(X,n)(X2XjXk), 
~d(A,n)(XZWY) = (J)4~d(A,n)(XiXjXkXl), 
where i, j, k, l ~ {1 . . . . .  2 n} are distinct. Further, 
A 2 
2 2 
~d(A'n)(XiXj) : ~(~ + 1)(/~ "[- 2)(A + 3)' 
7/t7 2 
g~a(*'n)(xixjxk) = A(A + 1)(A + 2)(A + 3) '  
~d(A'n)(XiXjXkXl) = ,~(h "[- 1)(A + 2)(h + 3) ; 
therefore, 
~'d(~,n)([E(pn A Pn-1) -- E(pn)E(pn-1)] 2) 
~2[ A~2 j2 j _ I ] [A ]3(A  
j2  j 4 ] /A I4  
+1) 
• [A(A + 1)(A + 2)(A + 3)] -1 
A 
16(A + 1)(A + 3)" 
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